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TEACHING ELEMENTS OF ELECTION LAW BEYOND THE 
DISCIPLINARY BORDERS OF “ELECTION LAW” 
FRANCES R. HILL* 
Teaching election law does not invariably mean teaching “Election Law” 
courses.  Many contributors to this Symposium undoubtedly teach well-
designed “Election Law” courses.  I have done something quite different.  I 
teach elements of election law in two courses on other subjects:1 Taxation of 
Exempt Entities2 and Constitutional Law I, a required first-year course on 
structural constitutional law.3  This short Essay begins with some general 
thoughts on the importance of election law in such disparate courses, the 
complexity of election law, and the implications of choices of what to teach, 
how to teach it, and what cannot be addressed. 
I.  ELECTION LAW: SOME CONTEXTUAL CONSIDERATIONS IN TEACHING 
Election law is an area of practice and scholarship marked by broad scope 
and technical complexity.  Election law consists of four subfields—voting 
rights, election administration, redistricting, and campaign finance.  Each of 
these four areas of election law is marked by internal complexity that has 
developed to the point that it may no longer be possible to develop a high 
degree of expertise in each of the four fields.  This is not to say that Election 
Law courses cannot or should not address all four areas, but it underscores the 
importance of making carefully considered choices about what to include. 
These choices involve not only what issues to consider but also what 
materials to assign.  There is a temptation to focus on Supreme Court decisions 
in Election Law courses.  Some textbook authors have defined a “canon” of 
such cases.  Whether there is an election law “canon” is an interesting 
 
* Frances R. Hill is a Professor of Law at the University of Miami School of Law, where she 
teaches courses in Tax, Constitutional Law, and Election Law. She earned her J.D. at the Yale 
Law School and her Ph.D. in comparative politics and political theory at Harvard University. 
 1. Periodically, I teach a seminar listed as Selected Topics in Election Law, but that is not 
the topic of this Essay. 
 2. This is a course mainly for students in Miami’s Graduate Program in Taxation but it is 
open to J.D. students who have taken Federal Income Tax. 
 3. Constitutional Law I is a four-credit course taught in the second semester of the first year 
at the University of Miami School of Law.  It focuses on balance of powers and federalism. 
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question,4 but it does not serve very well as the basis for deciding how to teach 
Election Law, either in a separate Election Law course or in other courses that 
intersect with election law.  I find no alternative to beginning with issues and 
then considering which cases, statutory provisions, regulatory provisions, and 
other guidance from either the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) or 
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) is necessary to allow students to understand 
those issues.5  Because we are a federal system, state statutes will become 
relevant even to understanding federal election law, and the U.S. Constitution 
applies to elections even at the local level, as states and localities are learning 
in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United.6 
My own approach to the selection of topics and materials is based on the 
questions of why and how elections matter.  The foundational answer is 
located in the first sentence of the Constitution, which states that “[w]e the 
People of the United States . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the 
United States of America.”7  The Constitution bases legitimate democratic 
government on the consent and participation of the people, who have a 
constitutionally defined role in governance.8  This is a principle of continuing 
consent through voting in properly conducted campaigns and elections.  This 
principle applies to all four areas of election law.  The right to vote, the right to 
have one’s vote count on a basis equal to other votes, the right to have one’s 
vote counted properly and honestly, and the right to have one’s voice heard in 
election campaigns are all part of constitutive voting.9  They are all elements 
ensuring that the sovereign people can play their constitutional role in 
legitimate government.  In sum, voting is both an individual right and a 
structural constitutional principle. 
 
 4. For perhaps the most illuminating use of the concept of a canon focusing on a case that is 
not commonly read or cited but should be, see Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, 
and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 296–97 (2000) (discussing Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 
475 (1903)). 
 5. Teaching students to deal with the materials that they will necessarily need to work with 
in their professional lives should be one of the goals in every course that we teach.  It is part of 
our duty to our students. 
 6. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 7. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 8. Frances R. Hill, Constitutive Voting and Participatory Association: Contested 
Constitutional Claims in Primary Elections, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 535 (2010); Frances R. Hill, 
Putting Voters First: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Citizen Sovereignty in Federal Election 
Law, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 155 (2006). 
 9. Frances R. Hill, Nonparticipatory Association and Compelled Political Speech: Consent 
as a Constitutional Principle in the Wake of Citizens United, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
550 (2011) [hereinafter Hill, Nonparticipatory Association].  For a shorter essay based on this 
article, see Frances R. Hill, Nonparticipatory Association and Compelled Political Speech: 
Consent as a Constitutional Principle in the Wake of Citizens United, in MONEY, POLITICS AND 
THE CONSTITUTION: BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED 77 (Monica Youn ed., 2011). 
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While I begin with the relationship between elections and the 
constitutional role of the people of the United States, I do not end there.  
Focusing only on the “big questions” makes election law appear too tidy.  
Election law principles and values have to be implemented evenhandedly and 
honestly in the midst of fierce contests for power, whether at the local or 
national level, and lawyers play an important role in designing election 
systems that can be implemented in this context.  The following two sections 
of this Essay illustrate the interplay of this framework with the technical 
complexity of election law and the law with which it intersects. 
II.  TEACHING ELECTION LAW IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I 
Constitutional Law I is a structural constitutional law course that focuses 
on the balance of powers and federalism.  There is no shortage of important 
material for this course.  Yet, I routinely have students read election law cases 
that present these issues with particular clarity in contemporary settings. 
Citizens United v. FEC10 is a case about, among other things, the balance 
of powers.  Like its predecessor case, Wisconsin Right to Life (“WRTL”),11 
Citizens United takes a strong position limiting the scope of permissible 
congressional action in matters relating to campaign finance.12  In the first-year 
course on structural constitutional law, the theory of balance of powers is a 
central focus.  As presented in the dueling opinions in McConnell,13 and then 
in WRTL, and again in Citizens United, there is a passionate difference over 
which branch of government will control the right of the people to have their 
voices heard in election campaigns.14  The larger question is whether this a 
structural constitutional issue or a matter of the rights of persons, not just 
people, to speak.  McConnell takes a structural approach.15  WRTL and Citizens 
United take an absolutist individual rights approach that denies the relevance 
of contextual factors and interprets the First Amendment with assertive, even 
pugnacious, literalism.16  Exploring these cases, students can see a clash 
between the Court and Congress that is quite remarkable.  This is not a subtle 
difference, and the language used shows little restraint. 
 
 10. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876. 
 11. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
 12. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
 13. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 14. See Frances R. Hill, Corporate Political Speech and the Balance of Powers: A New 
Framework for Campaign Finance Jurisprudence in Wisconsin Right to Life, 27 ST. LOUIS U. 
PUB. L. REV. 267, 270 (2008) (discussing the lack of allocation of financial jurisprudence to any 
branch of government). 
 15. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 223–24. 
 16. For a pointed, albeit indirect rejection of this approach to constitutional interpretation, 
see Justice David H. Souter, Harvard’s 359th Commencement Address, 124 HARV. L. REV. 429, 
432–34 (2010). 
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In McConnell, the Court repeatedly referenced Congress’s broad authority 
to legislate in the area of campaign finance and the fitness of deferring to the 
political branches on campaign finance issues.17  The majority based its 
opinion on the long history of congressional engagement in this area, which it 
interpreted as evidence that the people’s elected representatives had long 
protected government from domination by special interests.18 
Writing in dissent, Justice Kennedy concluded that the electioneering 
communication provisions of election law “demonstrate Congress’ 
fundamental misunderstanding of the First Amendment.”19  He charged that 
Congress enacted the provision knowing that it was unconstitutional.20  In light 
of this narrative, Justice Kennedy concluded that “we cannot cede authority to 
the Legislature to do with the First Amendment as it pleases.”21  Justice 
Kennedy demanded that Congress establish an empirical predicate for 
legislation beyond the experience or assertions of members of Congress.22 
The rhetoric escalated in WRTL, in which the McConnell dissenters now 
formed the majority.  The Court held that the electioneering communications 
before the Court in this case could be paid for with the organization’s general 
treasury funds.23  The Chief Justice’s opinion stated that the case was about 
“political speech.”24  He took the quite remarkable position, especially in an 
as-applied challenge to a statute, that litigation and discovery can be burdens 
on political speech.25 
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia expressed utter impatience with Chief 
Justice Roberts’s opinion.26  He claimed that the Court is “primarily 
responsible” for the First Amendment and asserted that it is “perhaps our most 
important constitutional task to ensure freedom of political speech.”27  Justice 
Scalia seems to present a theory of balance of powers as a series of interpretive 
monopolies over various parts of the Constitution.  Students tend to find that 
considering this possibility enlarges their understanding of balance of powers 
as a contested concept.  Contested issues include whether judicial review 
 
 17. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137, 203, 208. 
 18. Id. at 189–210. 
 19. Id. at 339 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 330. 
 22. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 298 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that the standard 
of corruption should not be “whether some persons, even Members of Congress, conclusorily 
assert that the regulated conduct appears corrupt to them,” but must instead look for inherent quid 
pro quo dangers). 
 23. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 481. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 468 n.5. 
 26. Id. at 499–501 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that as-applied challenges cannot protect 
First Amendment rights). 
 27. Id. at 503. 
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means that only the courts interpret the Constitution and whether the courts can 
establish standards for the legislative processes, including what kind of factual 
record, if any, Congress must prepare.  It is possible for students to see that the 
current majority has merged the standards applied for the purpose of 
interpreting Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment in substantive due 
process cases to its First Amendment jurisprudence in campaign finance cases. 
My structural constitutional law class generally ends with Bush v. Gore.28  
The class reads the entire case.  I would do this even if I did not teach in 
Florida.  For purposes of this course, Bush v. Gore offers a complex analysis of 
the intersection of the balance of powers and federalism, with the United States 
Supreme Court majority claiming that it had a right and a duty to protect the 
Florida Legislature from the Florida Supreme Court and summarily dismissing 
the Florida Supreme Court’s role in interpreting Florida statutes.29  The case is 
far more remarkable for its concept of federalism and the balance of powers 
than it is for the inversion of the usual position of the Justices on the Court.  
This is an issue that first-year students can understand.  It makes structural 
issues real and contemporary in a way that many of the older cases cannot. 
The core structural issue raises questions about the federal courts’ 
jurisdiction in this matter.  Students in a first-year class can think about this 
issue once they have considered Marbury v. Madison,30 where the Court 
appeared to find that Marbury would prevail but concluded on very 
problematic grounds that the Court lacked jurisdiction.  At the same time, the 
Court included dicta asserting the Court’s role in judicial review, thus 
consolidating the Court’s role as a co-equal branch of government.31 
In contrast to Marbury, the majority in Bush v. Gore did not find it 
necessary to include a jurisdictional statement or even to discuss jurisdiction.  
Does the cursory reference to equal protection32 constitute a statement of 
jurisdiction?  The majority did not say.  The concurring opinion, written by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, 
represents an effort to resolve the dissonance between the majority opinion and 
the Rehnquist Court’s development of federalism as a limit on the scope of 
federal government power.33  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s premise is that 
presidential elections implicate federal interests even though presidential 
 
 28. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
 29. Id. at 109–11. 
 30. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 31. Id. at 176–77.  In addition, Marbury developed the initial formulation of the political 
question doctrine, which links Marbury to Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), in which the Court 
held that the political question doctrine did not preclude Court consideration of vote dilution 
arising from impermissibly drawn state legislative districts. 
 32. Bush, 531 U.S. at 103. 
 33. Id. at 112–22 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
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electors are not themselves federal officers or agents.34  He then makes a 
passing reference to the Guarantee Clause,35 observing that “in ordinary cases, 
the distribution of powers among the branches of a State’s government raises 
no questions of federal constitutional law, subject to the requirement that the 
government be republican in character.”36  Based on the premise that this is not 
an ordinary case, Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized the role of state 
legislators in appointing electors for President and Vice President.37  He 
concluded that “[a] significant departure from the legislative scheme for 
appointing Presidential electors presents a federal constitutional question.”38 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence found that the Florida Supreme 
Court usurped the authority of the Florida Legislature, which violated the 
United States Constitution and created the basis for the United States Supreme 
Court’s jurisdiction.  The concurrence concluded that “the Florida Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Florida election laws impermissibly distorted them 
beyond what a fair reading required, in violation of Article II.”39  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist then attempted to reconcile the majority’s action in this case with 
his theory of federalism, claiming that the Court’s reasoning “does not imply a 
disrespect for state courts but rather a respect for the constitutionally 
prescribed role of state legislatures.”40  In any case, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
emphasized the lack of time for a state recount.41  Federalism, it seems, is 
inconsistent with statutory deadlines. 
The three dissents of Bush v. Gore present alternative analyses of 
federalism, balance of powers, and standing.  At the same time, the dissents 
differ among themselves.  This range of opinions permits students to develop 
their own ideas with the confidence that at least one other member of the Court 
might find merit in their ideas.  This makes class discussions more focused and 
 
 34. Id. at 112.  Chief Justice Rehnquist stated: 
  We deal here not with an ordinary election, but with an election for the President of 
the United States.  In Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934), we said: 
“While presidential electors are not officers or agents of the federal government (In re 
Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 [(1890)]), they exercise federal functions under, and discharge 
duties in virtue of authority conferred by, the Constitution of the United States.  The 
President is vested with the executive power of the nation.  The importance of his election 
and the vital character of its relationship to and effect upon the welfare and safety of the 
whole people cannot be too strongly stated.” 
Id. 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 36. Bush, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 37. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2). 
 38. Id. at 113. 
 39. Id. at 115.  But see Souter, supra note 16 (providing a critique of the “fair reading” 
model of constitutional interpretation). 
 40. Bush, 531 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 
 41. Id. at 121–22. 
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more vigorous than they tend to be when a few students are simply arguing for 
their personal views on a policy topic. 
Constitutional Law I is not an Election Law course, but Citizens United 
and Bush v. Gore are integral parts of it.  They address the framework question 
of the relationship between elections and legitimate government.  They 
introduce first-year students to statutes.  They make constitutional law part of 
the everyday law that they will work with as lawyers, not a remote topic 
suitable only for scholarly articles. 
III.  TEACHING ELECTION LAW IN TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 
Lawyers who represent tax-exempt entities will find that their clients face 
complex issues of reconciling advocacy of various types with protecting their 
tax-exempt status.42  Addressing these technical issues necessarily involves tax 
lawyers in constitutional law and in election law.  Tax lawyers face such issues 
as whether an exempt entity is operating as a political committee that must 
report to the FEC as well as to the IRS. 
Citizens United, like many of the leading campaign finance cases, involves 
a tax-exempt entity but not tax-exempt organization law.43  The Supreme Court 
has scarcely acknowledged that the entities are exempt from taxation and that 
they are exempt as particular types of exempt entities.  Tax lawyers cannot 
follow the same approach.  Tax lawyers have to consider what the Supreme 
Court’s decontextualized pronouncements mean for their particular clients.  
First Amendment absolutism is inconsistent with this undertaking.  Even 
though WRTL44 and Citizens United broaden the scope of electoral 
participation for certain exempt entities, these two cases, considered separately 
and together, pose difficult issues that tax lawyers must address when advising 
their exempt entity clients.  Tax lawyers have a duty to advise clients how to 
retain their exempt status while pursuing their exempt missions.  Playing a role 
in public policy can be an important part of the mission.  Simply advising 
clients not to engage in politics is completely inadequate.  Simply assuring 
clients that the First Amendment answers all of their tax questions and protects 
their tax-exempt status would also be completely inadequate.  At the same 
time, exempt entities are likely to have many supporters with divergent 
political views but with a common interest in a particular organization’s 
mission.  A tax-exempt organization has to protect both its exempt status and 
 
 42. In our treatise for tax professionals who represent tax-exempt entities, Douglas Mancino 
and I address issues relating to lobbying, issue advocacy, and campaign participation by a broad 
range of exempt entities.  The technical elements of the tax discussions in this short article can be 
found in FRANCES R. HILL & DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 
(2002).  A cumulative supplement is updated twice each year. 
 43. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 881 (2010). 
 44. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
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its ability to pursue its mission, which means that it cannot alienate its 
members and contributors.  Tax lawyers will be called upon to consider how to 
give members and contributors opportunities to support only the exempt 
mission without having their funds used to support candidates for elective 
office.  Organization managers quite understandably resist efforts by members 
and contributors to direct their contributions in this way. 
Citizens United and WRTL raise two issues at the core of exempt entity 
representation.  One is the method of reasoning that applies.  The second is 
what is meant by a general treasury. 
The issue of what kind of legal reasoning is consistent with the First 
Amendment has received less attention than it deserves in discussions of 
Citizens United.  For tax lawyers, this is a crucial element of the Court’s 
reasoning.  While the exempt organization provisions are stated in a very broad 
general terms, these broad concepts have to be interpreted in light of the facts 
and circumstances of each particular case.  If tax lawyers had a professional 
mantra, this would be it.  This phrase recurs throughout the regulations 
interpreting the Internal Revenue Code, including the provisions relating to 
exempt status.  The most recent guidance from the IRS is a Revenue Ruling 
that sets forth twenty-one examples.45  The examples turn on particular facts 
and circumstances. 
In WRTL, Chief Justice Roberts claimed to have developed a test that 
would replace a subjective facts-and-circumstances approach with an objective 
test for determining whether a communication was the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy.46  Chief Justice Roberts found that First Amendment 
jurisprudence “must eschew ‘the open-ended rough-and-tumble of factors,’ 
which ‘invit[es] complex argument in a trial court and a virtually inevitable 
appeal.’”47 In the same vein, Chief Justice Roberts found that prolonged 
discovery was inconsistent with the First Amendment.48 
In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy excoriated the FEC for developing a 
multi-part test in response to the Court ruling in WRTL.49  He analogized this 
approach to prior restraint, asserting that: 
This regulatory scheme may not be a prior restraint on speech in the strict 
sense of that term, for prospective speakers are not compelled by law to seek 
an advisory opinion from the FEC before the speech takes place.  As a 
practical matter, however, given the complexity of the regulations and the 
 
 45. Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421.  This ruling predates both WRTL and Citizens 
United.  The IRS has issued no further guidance, although it is sorely needed. 
 46. WRTL, 551 U.S. at 469–70. 
 47. Id. at 469 (quoting James B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredging & Dock Co., 513 
U.S. 527, 547 (1995)) (alteration in original). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 895–96 (2010) (citing 11 C.F.R. § 112.1 (2009)). 
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deference courts show to administrative determinations, a speaker who wants 
to avoid threats of criminal liability and the heavy costs of defending against 
FEC enforcement must ask a governmental agency for prior permission to 
speak.  These onerous restrictions thus function as the equivalent of prior 
restraint by giving the FEC power analogous to licensing laws implemented in 
16th- and 17th-century England, laws and governmental practices of the sort 
that the First Amendment was drawn to prohibit.50 
Based on this analogy to prior restraint, Justice Kennedy claimed that the 
resulting bootstrap supported very muscular practical consequences.51  If an 
organization finds it necessary or prudent to retain a campaign finance lawyer 
or to seek a private letter ruling or a decision by the FEC, Justice Kennedy 
would treat these actions as evidence that the law violated the First 
Amendment.52 
Justice Kennedy found that courts themselves would chill political speech 
if they engaged in this kind of reasoning.53  He concluded that “[t]he 
interpretive process itself would create an inevitable, pervasive, and serious 
risk of chilling protected speech pending the drawing of fine distinctions that, 
in the end, would themselves be questionable.”54  Justice Kennedy again 
considered facts-and-circumstances reasoning when he rejected Citizens 
United’s position in its briefs that the Massachusetts Citizens For Life 
(“MCFL”) exemption55 should be relaxed to permit it to accept a limited 
amount of contributions from taxable corporations.56  Justice Kennedy 
explained that “[w]e decline to adopt an interpretation that requires intricate 
case-by-case determinations to verify whether political speech is banned, 
especially if we are convinced that, in the end, this corporation has a 
constitutional right to speak on this subject.”57 
 
 50. Id. at 895–96 (citations omitted). 
 51. Id. at 896. 
 52. Justice Kennedy stated: 
The First Amendment does not permit laws that force speakers to retain a campaign 
finance attorney, conduct demographic marketing research, or seek declaratory rulings 
before discussing the most salient political issues of our day.  Prolix laws chill speech for 
the same reason that vague laws chill speech . . . . The Government may not render a ban 
on political speech constitutional by carving out a limited exemption through an 
amorphous regulatory interpretation. 
Id. at 889. 
 53. Id. at 891. 
 54. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 891. 
 55. In MCFL, the Court exempted nonprofit corporations from 2 U.S.C. § 441b’s restriction 
on spending, provided the corporation was formed for the express purpose of promoting political 
ideas, did not engage in business activities, and did not accept contributions from for-profit 
entities.  FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263–64 (1986). 
 56. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 891–92. 
 57. Id. at 892. 
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The Supreme Court thus found the method of reasoning central to tax 
analysis inconsistent with the kind of analysis required for First Amendment 
purposes, including campaign finance.  This leaves tax lawyers in a quandary.  
The IRS has issued no guidance based on Citizens United.  What authority do 
tax lawyers cite when advising their clients? 
One approach is to read Citizens United as defining what tax-exempt 
entities can do but not what they must do.  Citizens United does not compel 
exempt entities to make independent expenditures.  This is not, however, the 
fact pattern that most exempt organizations will bring to their tax lawyer.  
Instead, exempt entities will want to know how to characterize a particular 
activity or whether a particular communication is an issue ad or an independent 
expenditure or lobbying.  Citizens United offers no guidance.  The question is 
whether it has made application of the existing tax guidance based on facts and 
circumstances inconsistent with the First Amendment and a constitutionally 
impermissible burden on the entity’s political speech.  The most likely interim 
result is that tax lawyers will continue to rely on tax guidance in characterizing 
communications and will treat Citizens United as having expanded their ability 
to engage in independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or 
defeat of a particular candidate for public office.  Citizens United is silent on 
the tax consequences of exercising this newly defined First Amendment right.  
Presumably, § 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations, § 501(c)(5) unions and 
agricultural organizations, and § 501(c)(6) business leagues that make 
independent expenditures would not jeopardize their exempt status provided 
such expenditures are not the organizations’ primary activity.58 
How is an exempt entity’s primary activity determined?  No one knows, 
and the IRS has offered no guidance on the subject.  Even though Citizens 
United involved a § 501(c)(4) organization, the Court never addressed this 
issue.  The IRS has never addressed this issue more generally.  New § 
501(c)(4) independent expenditure organizations have addressed this issue by 
claiming that lobbying will be their primary activity. 
The Court in Citizens United refers repeatedly to general treasury funds.59  
To a tax lawyer, it is far from clear what this means when one moves beyond 
broad rhetoric to operational realities.  This issue arises because exempt 
organizations commonly hold their resources in various funds dedicated to 
specific activities.  It is far from clear how this practice relates to the concept 
of a general treasury.  Problems arise when certain members or contributors 
object to the use of the organization’s resources to support or oppose a 
particular candidate.  In this context, tax lawyers must consider how to keep 
tax-exempt organizations running smoothly when members and contributors 
do not share the same political interests despite their shared interest in the 
 
 58. See I.R.C. § 501(c) (2006). 
 59. See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886–87. 
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organization’s exempt activity.  This is not a serious problem for organizations 
created for the sole purpose of supporting particular candidates, and those 
organizations will do just enough lobbying to qualify for exemption under § 
501(c)(4).  But it may well be a problem for organizations that have other 
purposes.  In these organizations, use of the general treasury funds to support 
or oppose a particular candidate results in compelled speech by those who do 
not share the organization managers’ choice of candidates to support or 
oppose.60 
Writing for the majority in Citizens United, Justice Kennedy dismissed this 
issue with a breezy reference to “the ordinary mechanisms of corporate 
democracy.”61  Experts in corporation law have expressed little confidence in 
this analysis.62  Tax lawyers will not be able to satisfy their clients’ legitimate 
concerns by reference to Justice Kennedy’s dismissive language.  Instead, tax 
lawyers have to think about how to structure funds within the general treasury 
so that contributors who do not want their contributions used for independent 
expenditures can be confident that they will be used for the organizations’ 
exempt purposes.  Tax lawyers have to understand why creating a fund for 
persons who want their contributions used for independent expenditures would 
risk having their section 501 organization clients become political committees 
under federal law, thus requiring disclosure to the FEC.63  By focusing on the 
technical issues arising from the operation of exempt entities, tax lawyers find 
themselves considering the implications of Citizens United’s focus on entity 
speech even though it results in compelled speech when considered from the 
perspective of members and contributors. 
In addition to the technical tax issues arising from Citizens United, tax 
lawyers will be called upon to advise their clients on issues relating to 
disclosure of contributions and expenditures.  In the wake of Citizens United, 
various exempt entities have been able to collect very large sums of money and 
use that money to finance ads that expressly advocate the election or defeat of 
clearly identified candidates for public office without disclosure to the FEC or 
the public.  Directing money to and through a § 501(c)(4) social welfare 
organization, a § 501(c)(5) union, or a § 501(c)(6) business league creates a 
money trail with uncertain implications for disclosure.  This is an election law 
 
 60. See Hill, Nonparticipatory Association, supra note 9. 
 61. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911. 
 62. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010) (critiquing managerial control of corporate political speech).  For 
the classic critique of managerial control of corporate governance, see ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & 
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
 63. Independent expenditure-only organizations register with the FEC as political 
committees and agree that they will satisfy the disclosure requirements of political committees.  
Independent Expenditure-Only Committees, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/ 
press/press2011/ieoc_alpha.shtml (last updated Feb. 26, 2012). 
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issue that becomes more apparent when one considers the intersection of tax 
law and election law.64  Exempt organizations have generally sought to limit 
disclosure.  At the same time, they do not want the negative implications of 
serving as barriers to disclosure of the true source of large amounts of money 
ultimately used by an entity that does disclose to the FEC for independent 
expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of clearly identified 
candidates for the public office.  In this scenario, the independent expenditure 
entity need only disclose that the money came from the exempt entity, which is 
not required to disclose the source of the funds.  Tax lawyers will find 
themselves in quite unfamiliar legal territory, but this is territory that they will 
be expected to master. 
CONCLUSION 
Teaching election law in a structural constitutional law course and in a 
course on tax-exempt organizations suggests that the larger purpose of election 
will be realized through addressing quite complex technical issues that arise as 
election law intersects with other bodies of law.  The first sentence of the 
Constitution states that the people of the United States ordain and establish the 
Constitution.  This right and this duty are meaningless unless the people can 
participate meaningfully.  Teaching election law in a structural constitutional 
law course and in a course on tax-exempt organizations suggests that 
meaningful participation in our constitutional system implicates election law in 




 64. The tensions over disclosure by exempt entities involved in campaign finance are 
certainly not a new issue.  The contours of the debate have been apparent for almost twenty years, 
if not longer.  See Frances R. Hill, Newt Gingrich and Oliver Twist: Charitable Contributions and 
Campaign Finance, 11 EXEMPT ORGS. TAX REV. 43 (1995), reprinted in 66 TAX NOTES 237 
(1995); see also Frances R. Hill, Softer Money: Exempt Organizations and Campaign Finance, 32 
EXEMPT ORGS. TAX REV. 205 (1999), reprinted in 91 TAX NOTES 477 (2001). 
